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The Impact of Variations in Institutional Grafting Modes on Economic Growth: A Three-
Dimensional Approach 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This article explains the peculiarities of institutional effects on growth rates in post-
communist countries. By proposing a certain dependence of the institution-growth nexus on 
the mode of institutional grafting, the distinction between drift-phase and path-breaking 
institutional change is introduced. Theoretical juxtapositions show that transition countries’ 
institutions built through path-breaking institutional reforms differ from those that emerge 
evolutionarily in the drift phase in a twofold manner in their relationship to growth. Growth 
rates of their economies are less likely to depend on the quality of legal institutions and are 
more likely to be a function of the maturity of political institutions. In addition, legal 
institutional change in the post-communist world is a product of the quality of the political 
environment to a greater extent than their drift-phase alternatives. These propositions are 
tested empirically based on a sample of 87 countries derived from the POLITY IV Project's 
website.  
 
Keywords: institutional economics, formal institutions, institutional change, post-communist 
transition 
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The Impact of Variations in Institutional Grafting Modes on Economic Growth:  
A Three-Dimensional Approach  
 
Introduction 
Growth theory asserts that good formal institutions are conducive to rapid economic 
development. Empirical studies from economically developed and/or developing countries 
(Eicher & Leukert, 2009) largely support this claim (see Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) for 
an overview) but exclude the post-communist world as a unique group from the analysis 
(Bosworth & Collins, 2003). Research has been conducted independently on these countries 
and either substantiates conventional findings (see Aslund (2007) for a detailed overview). 
Or, it recognizes peculiarities concerning the effect that formal institutional frameworks have 
on economic growth, with the sign and strength of this impact varying depending on the 
phase of transition or the maturity of formal institutions (Fidrmuc & Tichit, 2009; De Melo, 
Denizer, Gelb, & Tenev, 1997; Falcetti, Raiser, & Sanfey, 2000).  
Studies stemming from former Soviet Union republics go even further and entirely 
negate the claim that free-market formal institutions per se may lead to economic prosperity 
in the course of transition (Mau, 2008; Polischuk, 2008; Polterovich, 2008). Capitalist formal 
institutions lack compatibility with post-communist informal norms due to the countries' 
insignificant historical experience with democracy and free markets (Yasin, 2003) or due to 
unique features of their economic systems (the military sector’s prevalence in their 
production capacities, dominant large companies, and a deep recession that started at the 
outset of transition) (Polterovich & Popov, 2006). In addition, the lack of strong political 
contexts, which assumes an independent political sector from the economic sector, is believed 
to hinder these countries from improving formal institutions. Their political elite often 
become economic elite (Aslund, 2007), as a result of which institutional reforms simply 
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promote the redistribution of economic or political power without generating substantial 
economic growth (Dementiev & Vishnevskiy, 2011). As a consequence, many transition 
economies appear to be locked in an institutional trap, with any institutional improvement 
being associated with considerable economic and social losses (Polterovich, 2008).  
Irrespective of the sign found in the relationship between formal institutions and 
economic growth, studies on transition economies possess one common feature: The impact 
of their formal institutions on growth is rarely tested in conjunction with developed and/or 
developing countries. An indirect comparison of results is hardly possible, since analyses do 
not use a standard set of conditioning variables and standard periods that would enable 
comparing findings. One should note that, in general, growth theory recognizes the existence 
of heterogeneity in the effects of formal institutions. It is well-established that the direction 
and strength of institutional impacts on growth vary depending on the maturity level of 
formal institutions (Barro, 1997; Fidrmuc & Tichit, 2009; Przeworski & Limongi, 1993) or a 
country’s level of economic prosperity (Eicher & Leukert, 2009; Lee & Kim, 2009). 
However, we doubt that these two explanations are exhaustive for all post-communist 
countries. Transition economies started their institutional reforms from a relatively similar 
platform in terms of their level of economic development and the type and degree of 
institutional maturity but ended up at very different success levels. We argue that the cross-
country variation of institutional effects on economic growth can also be attributed to the way 
in which such institutions were formed. The peculiar relationship of economic institutions to 
growth rates in transition economies can also be explained by the top-down nature of their 
institution building and socio-economic forces resulting from this process. 
The latter proposition requires that a theoretical model be constructed to juxtapose the 
post-communist pattern of institution building with the pattern prevalent in other countries to 
identify implications that this mode of institutional grafting may have for a country’s growth 
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dynamics. This study adopts the conventional definition of formal institutions as the basic 
formal rules, such as laws and regulations, that govern interactions among economic agents. 
We further narrow the concept of formal institutions to legal institutions, such as property 
rights and contract enforcement legislation, since they are viewed as the key to economic 
growth (North, 1990) and have been the least successfully reformed in post-communist 
countries (Aslund, 2007).  
 
Analytical Model 
Institutional economics distinguishes between two modes of institutional grafting: 
drift/evolution and critical junctures. The first describes institutional change that evolves in 
small cumulative stages within an established institutional path. The second considers radical 
changes that result from a country's exposure to shocks sufficient to break society out of the 
outmoded, suboptimal path and shift into a new one (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). Drawn 
upon this distinction, we alternatively use the adjective "drift-phase" to describe the 
evolutionary type of institutional change and the term "path-breaking" when referring to 
institutional change at critical junctures.  
Each mode of institutional change is characterized by a distinct logic of the institution 
formation process, affecting economic development in a certain way. To demonstrate this, we 
introduce a new conceptual framework to juxtapose the two types of institutional grafting 
processes. Since we primarily focus on the post-communist world, our point of departure is 
derived from the logic of a free-market economy defined as an economic system based on the 
exchange of goods and services between economic agents at market prices (Aslund, 2007). 
Given this definition, we suggest that the formation of legal rules regulating the exchange 
process can be understood by accounting for: (1) economic agents' values and attitudes 
concerning production and exchange processes; (2) the economic system's structural elements 
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in which production and exchange occur; and (3) the behavior of actors who devise legal 
rules that regulate interactions concerning production and exchange. Based on this reasoning, 
we present institutional grafting as shaped by three forces that correspond to three dimensions 
of the institutional space: (1) cultural, (2) structural, and (3) political.  
The first dimension is a cultural one (Boettke, Coyne, & Leeson, 2008; Portes, 2006) 
which is similar to North's concept of informal institutions (North, 1990). It includes 
prevalent values/norms that dictate right and wrong, as well as behaviors describing how 
likely it is that an individual’s conduct deviates from their good morals. The second 
dimension is structural and encompasses economic forces that reflect a country's economic 
infrastructure and the nature of economic arrangements. It predefines the extent to which a 
country's economic system is in tune with the logic of free-market economic processes and 
includes financial and banking systems, taxation, trade union, labor market institutions, 
industrial relations, etc. The third dimension is called political and includes two aspects: (1) 
political elites that deal with the formalization of new institutions, and (2) political 
institutions that comprise the rules that formalize the prevailing political interests into a legal 
framework.  
It is believed that the three dimensions are related to each other in some way. 
However, that issue is beyond the scope of our analysis. Instead, we argue that legal 
institutions should be commensurate with the logic of each of the three dimensions in order to 
function effectively and promote economic development. Consequently, economic growth 
should be viewed as a function of the level of congruence between legal institutions and these 
three dimensions. We further argue that the level of this congruence may vary across the 
phases of institutional change (drift/evolution or path-breaking/critical junctures) and can be 
a priory identified from the logic of institution building in each of these phases.  
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From this perspective, the logic of the (evolutionary) institutional change that occurs 
during a drift along the established institutional path can be described as follows. As 
economic agents operate, they accumulate knowledge and experiences, which leads to 
technological advancements and further promotes the division of labor (Davis, 2010). This 
changes the organization of production processes in a country and shifts the structural 
dimension by establishing new industries, competition terms, pricing mechanisms, and 
conditions of resource allocation across various economic sectors. Profound change in the 
economic domain leads to transformations in how economic agents think and the values they 
hold. As a result, existing formal institutions are no longer adequate and commensurate with 
the existing economic structures and values among economic agents, thereby raising market 
transaction costs (North, 1990). Contractual arrangements begin to create demand for 
institutional change that can lower transaction costs to exploit new opportunities (Pejovich, 
1999). In trying to overcome the existing inconsistencies, economic agents introduce 
informal changes (Eggertsson, 1997) among formal “rules of the game” in order to make the 
institutional framework more flexible. If efficient and compatible with the interests of 
political elites (Portes, 2006), these changes are captured by the political system, which 
formalizes and legalizes them. As a result, they acquire the status of formal institutions. 
Private international commercial law provides an example of the drift-phase institutional 
grafting (Boettke et al., 2008): The development of cross-culture exchange in 11th- and 12th-
century Europe led to the spontaneous formation of the lex mercatoria, an informal system of 
customary law rooted in international commercial norms (Boettke et al., 2008). These 
informal institutions appeared to be effective and were later formalized into international 
commercial law.  
The drift-phase institutional change is hence likely to produce legal institutions that 
are congruent with our model's three dimensions: First, institutional change is initiated by 
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economic agents through the bottom-up approach, as a result of which the new institutions 
are congruent with the values economic agents hold. Second, formal institutions are also 
congruent with the existing economic structure, since changes in the old institutions primarily 
occur as a reaction to shifts in the economic system or technologies. Third, the role of 
political elites in institution creation is relatively insignificant and restricted to formalizing 
institutions that previously emerged at the micro-level. The flexibility of political bodies, 
however, determines how rapidly new legal institutions that meet such demand are adopted 
(Davis, 2010).   
The logic of path-breaking institutional reforms that occur at critical junctures differs 
substantially from the drift-phase logic. The distinct feature of this mode of institutional 
change is that shifts in a country’s political system, often triggered by a political regime 
change, precede changes in its economic system (Fidrmuc, 2003). Such reforms rarely 
require the population’s broad support, since the economic crisis caused by the previous 
regime’s shortcomings serves to justify introducing essential alterations in both political and 
economic systems (Olson, 1982). Alternatively, the population’s dissatisfaction with the 
current regime can encourage citizens to demand changes in both political and economic 
domains even if the incumbent elites resist such reforms. Radical political change can occur 
either through revolutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012), as recent events in Arabic 
countries demonstrate, or in a peaceful manner without wars and coups (Olson, 1982), as in 
the majority of post-communist countries during the collapse of socialism (Aslund, 2007).  
The radical political alterations require adjusting the institutional framework to the 
new political logic and promote an immediate introduction of an entirely new set of legal 
institutions, commensurate with the logic of the new political regime. Many pitfalls exist at 
various stages of carrying out institutional reform during this process. First, a shift in the 
political power and the initial immaturity of new political institutions may create a temporary 
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vacuum of power and opportunities for political or economic elites to seek rents through the 
new legal institutional framework (Aslund, 2007). Second, even if this is not the case and the 
population's interests dominate in the process of building a new legal institutional framework, 
the quality of the new legal institutions ultimately depends on whether political elite 
incumbent to handle the institutional grafting are sufficiently familiar with the new economic 
system and relevant legal rules. Third, since such knowledge and skills are often missing, it is 
likely that building a new institutional framework involves borrowing legal rules from 
countries with political and economic orders close to those desired. As a result, the new legal 
institutions become imposed from without (Pejovich, 1999), which in turn leads to two kinds 
of problems.  
On the one hand, implanting foreign institutions into another local context may 
disturb their congruence with characteristics of the structural dimension already in force. The 
introduction of Western industrial legislation in CIS countries is a good example of this. The 
new rules proved inefficient for post-communist economic systems, since Western legislation 
was designed for postindustrial societies with a prevalence of medium and small businesses, 
while many CIS economies were characterized by the overrepresentation of large (state) 
enterprises (Polterovich & Popov, 2006). On the other hand, a similar incongruence may also 
emerge between the new legal institutions and the local cultural dimension (Boettke et al., 
2008; Kyriazis & Zouboulakis, 2005; Portes, 2006). Because culture is unique, economic 
agents may perceive and interpret the newly imported legal rules through the prism of their 
specific values, as a result of which the meanings assigned by economic agents to the new 
laws might appear completely different from their initial context (Portes, 2006). This may 
further lead to a mutation of the new legal institutions (Vernikov, 2009) or low levels of their 
enforcement (Portes, 2006). 
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The learning experience is expected to minimize or eliminate both kinds of 
incongruence (Nelson & Sampat, 2001). If policymakers design and introduce adjustment 
policies for the system’s orderly operation at each stage during the transition period, the 
incompatibility between the new legal institutions and economic structures is believed to be 
gradually narrowed. Similarly, if economic actors learn that adapting to the new legal 
institutions can expand their opportunity set, they may change their cultural values and 
behaviors. For instance, post-communist countries in which new democratic governments 
successfully introduced economic reforms experienced a rise in pro-democratic attitudes 
among citizens (Aslund, 2007). Successful reformers have also nurtured strong support for a 
free-market economy (Aslund, 2007). These learning processes imply, however, that there 
are lags between fundamental institutional change being initiated and the time when the 
relevant actors get the structures right (Eggertsson, 1997), producing a positive impact for the 
local economy only in later periods (De Melo et al., 1997; Falcetti et al., 2000). 
Japan’s post-war reconstruction, which included changes in the political regime, 
major economic rules, and legislation, is a good example of the path-breaking approach to 
institutional grafting (Boettke et al., 2008). Overall, the path-breaking process of institution 
formation is unlikely to produce legal institutions that are congruent with our model's three 
dimensions: First, institutional change is profound and may include the top-down 
introduction of radical institutional reforms by implanting foreign institutions into the local 
systems. It is possible that these legal institutions will be incongruent with existing cultures, 
at least at the initial reform stage. Second, similar incongruence may also exist between the 
new legal institutions and the current economic structure for the same reason as above. Third, 
the role of political elites is superior and cannot be confined to legalizing new institutions but 
extends to their selection, design, introduction, and subsequent adjustments to the cultural 
and structural dimensions in place. The quality of new legal institutions might hence depend 
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on the quality of the country's political change and the professionalism of political elites 
incumbent to handle institutional grafting under the new conditions.  
The above discussion suggests that the odds of ensuring congruence between the new 
legal institutions and the three dimensions differ substantially for the two modes of 
institutional change. This allows us to argue that economies might be endowed with different 
opportunity sets for growth, depending on the mode of institutional grafting through which 
the new legal institutions emerge:  
Proposition 1: Because legal institutions formed in the drift phase are more likely to 
be congruent with the three dimensions, they will more effectively enhance economic 
development than legal institutions introduced at critical junctures. The rationale behind our 
reasoning is that when this congruence exists, fewer frictions emerge in the interactions 
between economic agents, making more transactions possible and leading to higher rates of 
economic growth. 
Proposition 2: Since institutional change at critical junctures is usually profound and 
may require a learning process for both political elites and economic agents at least in the 
short run, the positive impact of the new legal institutions on economic growth will be 
lagged. The learning processes might also be non-linear, and as institutional elements 
approach an optimal design, they must induce a better learning process.  
Proposition 3: The role of the political dimension is superior at critical junctures; we 
hence expect that its quality is of particular importance to the country's growth rates when the 
institutional framework is subjected to path-breaking institutional reforms. We identify two 
major mechanisms through which the political dimension's role manifests itself at critical 
junctures: (a) mitigating the negative impact of incongruence between the new legal 
institutions and the cultural or structural dimensions on economic growth (see Proposition 4) 
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and (b) designing and introducing new legal institutions that not only of good qualities but 
also congruent with the existing cultural and structural dimensions (see Proposition 5). 
Proposition 4: Since path-breaking institutional change at critical junctures are more 
likely to produce legal institutions that are incongruent with the cultural and structural 
dimensions, a country's growth rates become a function of the ability of political elites to 
adjust economic structures and/or cultures to the new legal institutions' logic. By contrast, the 
drift-phase institutional reforms produce legal institutions congruent with our model's 
dimensions and hence seldom require such adaptation measures or coordinating actions on 
the part of the government.  
Proposition 5: Since path-breaking institutional change at critical junctures 
presupposes a radical transformation of the entire institutional framework through a top-down 
approach, the quality of the new legal institutions becomes a function of the experience and 
skillfulness of political elites who handle the institutional grafting process. Their ability to 
choose the appropriate set of institutions predetermines the extent to which institution 
building processes are successful and newly imported legal institutions are of good qualities 
and congruent with local cultures and existing economic structures.   
Based on these propositions, we postulate the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: A positive impact of legal institutions on economic growth is greater 
when these institutions emerge in the drift phase rather than at critical junctures.  
Hypothesis 2: Because of the learning process, improvements in legal institutions at 
critical junctures are expected to lead to (a) lagged and (b) non-linear improvements in rates 
of economic growth.  
 Hypothesis 3: The political dimension's positive impact on economic growth is 
greater at critical junctures than in the drift phase of institutional grafting. 
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Hypothesis 4: At critical junctures, the negative impact of incongruence that emerge 
between new legal institutions and the cultural/structural dimensions is smaller for growth 
rates of those countries where the political dimension is of better qualities.   
Hypothesis 5: The political dimension's positive impact on the quality of legal 
institutional change is greater at critical junctures rather than in the drift phase.  
 
Data and Method Description 
To test these hypotheses, we use Eicher’s and Leukert’s (2009) approach of splitting 
the sample into subsamples and conducting an empirical analysis for each of them. In 
forming our subsamples, we use the idea that institutional change at critical junctures 
presupposes a simultaneous transformation of the entire framework of formal institutions. 
Since such a radical transformation usually occurs because of a shift in the nature of 
economic relations and the logic of economic processes, we assume that only a political 
regime change can initiate path-breaking legal institutional reforms. This means that in 
choosing countries for our sample, the type of political regime and form of autocracy or 
democracy which the selected countries have was irrelevant. Instead, what matters is whether 
there was any sudden transition from one political regime to another. This idea is also in line 
with the hierarchy of institutions hypothesis, which assumes that formal legal institutions are 
a function of political institutions within which a certain political regime is embedded (Eicher 
& Leukert, 2009).  
To identify whether a country has experienced recent changes in its political regime, 
we use the POLITY IV Project’s website (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm), 
which provides information about political regime characteristics and transitions between 
1800 and 2012 with a polity score for a wide range of countries (see appendix 1 for a country 
choice description). The values of a country’s annual polity score range from -10 to 10, with 
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values 6 and above denoting full democracy and -6 and below denoting full autocracy. In our 
analysis, a country qualifies as being at critical junctures if: (1) there was a political regime 
change in which values shifted from at least -6 or below to at least 6 and above; (2) this 
change is rapid and occurred within a few years; (3) this change occurred after 1970. Any 
earlier transition is expected to produce institutions that would adhere to the local structural 
and cultural characteristics through the learning process and eliminate any incongruence. In 
this case, the new formal institutions would follow an evolutionary or drift-phase path in their 
maturation process; (4) the change is stable with no signs of reverting to the previous regime 
in the following years; (5) there have not been persistent fluctuations in the regime trend of 
more than 3 points since 1970. Regime trend fluctuations denote political instability, which is 
a separate issue with respect to growth analysis and has both positive and negative effects on 
economic development (Jong-A-Pin, 2009).  
Since we are primarily interested in transition economies, our base path-breaking 
subsample only includes 21 post-communist countries that correspond to the above criteria. 
One should note that these countries are relatively heterogeneous in their historical trends 
(Soviet Union membership, experience with private property during communism, etc.) and 
present characteristics (EU membership, democracy types, etc.). We justify unifying them in 
one sample, because they all had a one-party political regime during communism with a 
centrally planned economic system. And they all underwent a profound institutional 
transformation with the same target: Transition to a free market economy and the 
introduction of democracy, which involved a radical change in the rules governing both 
political and economic processes. The fact that they slightly differ in their starting points does 
not contradict the purpose of our analysis, since the quantitative impact of initial conditions 
on the set of reforms and economic growth is small and tends to rapidly decline over time 
(Berg, Borensztein, Sahay, & Zettelmeyer, 1999; Falcetti et al., 2000). To ensure that the 
THE IMPACT OF VARIATIONS IN INSTITUTIONAL GRAFTING MODES ON 
GROWTH                                                                                                                                15                                                                                                                                  
 
empirical results are not unique to post-communist countries, we expand the path-breaking 
subsample by including non-post-communist countries that meet the above criteria, thereby 
increasing this subsample to 42 countries. 
Countries that have not experienced political regime change or have experienced 
profound but gradual change (each stage of change not being greater than a 3-point 
fluctuation in the polity score) are considered to be in the drift phase. The base drift 
subsample is limited to 22 old and stable democracies or autocracies to avoid a 
disproportionate subsample size. Since most of these countries are relatively advanced in 
their economic development, we expand this subsample by adding other developed and 
developing countries and augmenting this subsample to 45 countries. These countries are also 
heterogeneous in their characteristics. Common for all of them is that there has not been any 
rapid change in their political regime. Appendix 2 lists the countries included in each of the 
subsamples. One should note that some of these countries lack data on institutional or 
political indexes, which results in a smaller number of cases actually used in each type of 
analysis.  
We are primarily interested in comparing how formal legal and political institutions 
impact economic growth for the two country groups: evolutionary/drift versus path-
breaking/critical junctures. The quality of legal institutions is approximated through a 
contract enforcement and property rights protection index sourced from the 2007 annual 
report of the Economic Freedom of the World (see Gwartney, Lawson, Sobel, & Leeson 
(2007) for the detailed description of the index composition). The values vary from 1 (bad 
legal institutions) to 10 (good legal institutions). Formal institutions are considered to be 
good when they are clearly defined and well-enforced, which means that the institutional 
scores are closer to 10.  
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The political dimension's quality is measured through the control of corruption in    
government, government effectiveness, the quality of regulation, and voice and 
accountability. All political indexes are sourced from the World Bank Group database and 
vary from -2.5 (bad political situation) to 2.5 (ideal political situation). The four indexes are 
highly correlated, with the voice and accountability index showing the greatest uniqueness in 
its variance (see table 1). We use this index to describe the quality of democratic settings in a 
country and hence the quality of political institutions. The three remaining indexes are 
combined by using the STATA predict option for factor analysis to construct a single 
measure of the policymaking quality which is expected to approximate the quality of political 
elites. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the key variables (see table 2). 
 
[insert Table 1 and Table 2 here] 
 
We follow Tabellini (2008) in measuring the cultural dimension through the four 
aspects (control, respect, trust, and obedience) and source the relevant measures from the 
World Values Survey. Obedience represents the percentage of people in the sample who 
mentioned obedience as an important factor in society. Trust and respect are positive 
responses to questions about trusting most of the people and whether most people show 
tolerance and respect towards others. Control is operationalized through the question about 
how much freedom of choice and control people have over their own lives. The aggregate 
variable is constructed by adding up the values of control, respect, and trust, and subtracting 
the value of obedience. Since many countries included in the subsamples participated in one 
wave of the WVS, the cultural variable is available only on a cross-sectional basis.  
We follow Eicher and Schreiber (2010) in operationalizing the structural dimension 
and utilize the EBRD measures to construct a structural policy index, consisting of price 
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liberalization, foreign exchange/trade liberalization, small/large scale privatization, enterprise 
reform, competition policy reform, banking sector reform, and non-banking financial 
institutional reform. We use the STATA predict option for factor analysis to create a single 
construct. We limit the analysis of the structural dimension to the base path-breaking 
subsample, since the relevant data are only available for this set of countries. 
To test our hypotheses empirically, we use the dynamic GMM method proposed by 
Arellano and Bond (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998). The procedure for 
applying this technique is well-documented by Pääkkönen (2010), Lee and Kim (2009), and 
Eicher and Schreiber (2010). It requires that the equation is first-differenced to eliminate the 
heterogeneity in production functions and then an instrumental variable method is applied on 
the differenced model, with lagged values of the endogenous variables used as instruments 
for the variables themselves. To avoid an overfitting bias, we often restrict instruments to 
only few lags of the respective variables. We further use the STATA collapse sub-option to 
create one instrument for each variable and lag distance rather than one for each time period, 
variable, and lag distance. We also add the sub-options small to request small-sample 
corrections to the covariance matrix estimate. We calculate a two step estimator instead of a 
one step. Additionally, we use the sub-option noleveleq that invokes difference instead of 
system GMM. To demonstrate the correctness of the model, we report the number of 
instruments generated by the model, the results from a Hansen overidentification test, and the 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) serial correlation in the residuals. STATA command extabond2 
is used for calculating the model parameters.  
In line with Pääkkönen’s study (2010), we utilize yearly data for the period from 1996 
to 2008. We exclude the initial transition years from the analysis, since the outset of 
transition entailed profound systemic changes (Fidrmuc, 2003). We apply the same model to 
both subsamples while ensuring that a standard set of conditioning variables and standard 
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periods are used. Our base growth model includes two variables: investment and inflation. 
Investment is included, since it is the key predictor in the majority of growth models (Solow, 
1956). Macroeconomic stability is, in turn, considered a precondition for economic recovery 
during transition in the post-communist world (Fischer, Sahay, & Vegh, 1996) and an 
important growth factor for emerging markets in general (Dattels & Miyajima, 2009; Emara, 
2012). For these two variables, we do not discuss differences in the coefficient estimates 
between the drift and path-breaking subsamples, as this is beyond the scope of our research. 
We primarily focus on juxtaposing the impact of formal legal institutions and political 
indexes on growth rates. Hence, the base model is:  
 
lnYit =αlnYit-1 + β1lnKit + β2lnMSit + εit                                                                                                        (1) 
 
Where Yit is a measure of economic development limited to economic growth and 
operationalized through an annual real GDP growth rate, Yit-1 is one-period-lagged economic 
growth. K stands for the investment in physical capital measured through gross capital 
formation as a percentage of GDP. MS represents macroeconomic stability captured by 
annual consumer price inflation. The main source for the above variables is the World Bank 
electronic database.  
We begin the analysis with testing the key premise of our theoretical model that 
incongruence between the new legal institutions and our model's three dimensions is 
detrimental to economic growth: 
 
lnYit =αlnYit-1 + β1lnKit + β2lnMSit + β3D_Culture it + β4D_Structureit + β5D_Politicsit 
+ εit                                                                                                                                                                                                               (2)                                             
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Where D_ is a measure of incongruence expressed through the distance between the 
quality of a country's legal institutions and one of the three dimensions and calculated as 
follows:  Distance = [(Legal institutional index - Dimensions' value) / Dimensions' value]. 
Since cultural measures are available on a cross-sectional basis, we calculate annual distances 
between legal institutions and the cultural dimension as differences between legal scores for 
every year and the constant cultural scores. Our main assumption here is that culture remains 
relatively stable over the period analyzed.  
We further include formal legal institutions (LI) into the base model: 
                                                              
lnYit =αlnYit-1 + β1lnKit + β2lnMSit + β3LIit + εit                                                                                      (3) 
 
Similarly, we include political dimension indexes (PI) into the base model as: 
 
lnYit =αlnYit-1 + β1lnKit + β2lnMSit + β3PIit + εit                                                                                      (4)                                                                   
 
At this stage of the analysis, we are able to compare the coefficient estimates of the 
legal institutional variable, LI, and the political dimension variable, PI, between the drift and 
path-breaking subsamples. To explore the mechanisms through which the importance of the 
political dimension manifests itself at critical junctures, we first analyze the role of the 
democratic settings and decision-making quality in mitigating the detrimental impact of 
incongruence on economic growth by allowing interactions between the distance variables 
and the political dimension's measures: 
 
lnYit =αlnYit-1 + β1lnKit + β2lnMSit + β3PIit + β4D_Culture it + β5D_Structureit + 
β6PI*D_Culture it + β7PI*D_Structureit + εit                                                                                                               (5) 
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Where PI*D_Culture and PI*D_Structure are interaction terms between the political 
indexes and distances that legal institutions develop to culture or economic structure 
respectively.  
We further proceed to exploring the impact of political indexes on the quality of legal 
institutional change: 
 
LI_change it=αLIit-1 + ρ1Life_expectit + ρ2PIit + μit                                                                                 (6) 
 
Where LI_change stands for an annual change in the legal institutional index during 
the period analyzed and is calculated as [(Legal Institutional Index in year t - Legal 
Institutional Index in year (t-1)] / Legal Institutional Index in year (t-1). LI it-1 is a lagged 
value of the legal institutional index, PI is political institution indexes (democratic settings 
and policymaking quality indexes), and Life_expect stands for life expectancy. Life 
expectancy is included in the equation, since it is considered a standard predictor of formal 
institutions, along with the latitude variable (see Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), 
Islam (2004) for the examples of institutional equations). Life expectancy captures a 
country’s disease environment, which is believed to have predetermined the kind of formal 
institutions that initially emerged in a country and persisted over time (Acemoglu et al., 
2001). Unlike a more conventional measure of the disease environment, such as settler 
mortality rates, this variable is available on an yearly basis and for all of the selected 
countries, including transition economies. Since formal institutions may influence the quality 
of life and impact life expectancy, we consider this variable endogenous and insert it into the 
gmmstyle option to instrument it with the lagged values of the variable itself. In contrast, the 
latitude variable is considered strictly exogenous and is included in the ivstyle option.  
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Empirical results  
Table 3 confirms the idea that path-breaking institutional reforms are more likely to 
produce institutions that are incongruent with our model's three dimensions: The absolute 
values of the distance variables are greater for the path-breaking subsamples than for the drift 
subsamples. The only exception is the distance to the democratic settings quality that proves 
greater in the drift phase than at critical junctures. Given the increased role of political 
institutions in the design of institutional grafting processes at critical junctures, this finding 
does not contradict the logic of our discussion. 
We also receive support for our key assumption that increasing the distance between 
legal institutions and the three dimensions may worsen a transition country's economic 
performance (see table 4). A similar relationship is found for the extended drift subsample, 
but only partially confirmed for the extended path-breaking subsample (see table 5). The lack 
of complete evidence for the extended path-breaking subsample can be attributed to a great 
number of missing values for the cultural variable. Concerning the policy decision-making 
index, this may also mean that at critical junctures, what matters is not the distance that legal 
institutions develop to the political dimension, but the actual quality of this political 
dimension.   
 
[insert Table 4 and Table 5 here] 
 
Our empirical results also confirm the idea of heterogeneity in the impact of legal and 
political indexes on the economic growth between the drift and path-breaking subsamples. 
The legal institutional index strongly affects growth rates of economies operating within the 
institutions formed via evolutionary institutional change for both the base and extended drift 
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subsamples (see tables 6 and 7). We also establish a positive relationship between 
institutional indexes and growth rates when the analysis shifts to the path-breaking 
subsamples, but this impact is substantially smaller compared to the drift subsamples. These 
results stand up to the alternative model specification choice and to the exclusion of resource-
rich countries from the analysis.  
 
[insert Table 6 and Table 7 here] 
 
A closer analysis of institutional effects on economic performance at critical junctures 
suggests that in the long run, legal institutions of countries in both the base and extended 
path-breaking subsamples developed some relationship with rates of economic growth. If 
relating lagged values of institutional indexes to growth rates (see tables 8 and 9), one finds a 
positive association between the two variables, which is commensurate with hypothesis 2(a). 
Additionally, we establish that the short-term impact is often non-linear, which is consistent 
with hypothesis 2(b). The negative coefficient on the main effect of the legal institutional 
variable suggests that when the new legal institutions are of poor qualities (the values of the 
legal score are low), such legal institutions constitute a negative growth factor. In turn, a 
positive quadratic term means that, as the quality of institutions improves, the negative effect 
is offset and legal institutions become a positive determinant of economic growth. A similar 
non-linear relationship was also found by Fidrmuc and Tichit (2009) in the relationship 
between economic reforms and economic growth in the post-communist region and by De 
Melo et al. (1997) concerning the impact of structural reforms on economic growth. The 
initially negative impact of transition reforms on economic growth is often explained by high 
adjustment costs (De Melo et al., 1997), which turns into a positive impact in subsequent 
years (Falcetti et al., 2000). Alternatively, this may imply that when the quality of formal 
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institutions is poor, they are either of an extractive nature or allow wide rent-seeking in the 
economy, hindering economic development. The example of privatization in the Ukraine and 
Russia demonstrates how establishing the institution of private property, which was necessary 
for wide-scale privatization, could harm local economies by causing a considerable output 
drop (Aslund, 2007).  
 
[insert Table 8 and Table 9 here] 
 
 
This non-linear relationship between legal institutions and rates of economic growth 
suggests that economies from the path-breaking subsamples may grow fast even if formal 
legal institutions are poorly developed. Accounting for the level of institutional enforcement 
may contribute to clarifying these unusual results. We use a corruption perceptions index 
constructed by Transparency International to measure the level of institutional enforcement 
with values varying between 1 (complete corruption) and 10 (no corruption). By allowing the 
legal institutional variable and the corruption perceptions index to interact, we obtained 
evidence for the smoothing effects of poor enforcement of confusing formal institutions on 
the dynamics of economic growth. Accordingly, improvements in enforcement levels of legal 
institutions without improving such institutions may impair economic development in 
transition countries (see column 4 in table 8). If the enforcement mechanism is coupled with 
improving the quality of property rights and contract enforcement legislation, the main 
negative effect is offset and reducing corruption fosters economic development. We found a 
similar relationship for the extended path-breaking subsample, but the results remain 
statistically insignificant, suggesting that post-communist economies may represent a 
particular group (see table 9).  
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Tables 10 to 13 juxtapose the impact of the political dimension on economic growth 
between the drift and critical juncture subsamples. The results are largely consistent with the 
expectations formulated in hypothesis 3 and suggest that economies operating within a path-
breaking institutional framework formed at critical junctures are more sensitive to the quality 
of their political sector, especially concerning political decision-making. The policymaking 
quality index develops a closer relationship with growth rates of countries from the path-
breaking subsamples. In the case of the drift subsamples, it is more important that strong 
democratic settings exist to allow these economies to grow faster. The results also remain 
robust to alternative model specification choices or to the exclusion of resource rich countries 
from the extended subsamples. 
 
[insert Table 10, Table 11, Table 12  and Table 13 here] 
 
To further understand the role of the political dimension at critical junctures, we 
introduce interactions between political indexes and the distance between legal institutions 
and our model's dimensions. The negative coefficient estimates on the distance variables (see 
table 14) suggest that increasing the distance to the cultural or structural dimensions may 
slow down economic growth. The positive coefficient estimates on the interaction terms in 
turn indicate that the mature political environment may cushion the negative impact of this 
distance, supporting hypothesis 4. The interaction effect is especially strong for the extended 
path-breaking subsample.  
 
[insert Table 14 here] 
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Our results further suggest that during the path-breaking institutional reforms, the 
quality of the political environment is instrumental in building legal institutions (see table 
15). The path-breaking institutional change proves particularly sensitive to the quality of 
political decision-making. By contrast, a drift-phase institutional change is relatively 
independent from the quality of policymaking but influenced by the democratic settings 
quality. These results hold true for both base and extended subsamples. Additionally, table 16 
indicates that the distance variables' negative impact on the legal institutional change can be 
mitigated if the quality of the political environment (democratic settings and political 
decision-making scores) improves. The above findings are consistent with hypothesis 5.  
 
[insert Table 15 and Table 16 here] 
 
Overall, the empirical analysis supports the original hypotheses. Moreover, the results 
can be considered robust given the selected robustness check strategies: (1) the drift 
subsample included economically developing countries to avoid the difference in coefficients 
being caused by variances in the level of economic or institutional maturity between the two 
country groups; (2) we included non-post-communist countries in the path-breaking 
subsample to verify whether the specificities found for post-communist countries are 
universal or unique to the post-communist world; (3) we eliminated resource rich countries 
and small economies from both subsamples. The list of such countries was retrieved from 
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992). One should note that the results for transition economies 
(the base path-breaking subsample) show slight peculiarities as compared to other countries 
from the extended path-breaking subsample. We believe that this difference is due to 
specificities of the socialist regime. While Communism represented a dictatorship, it was 
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characterized by relatively high industrialization levels, albeit militarized to a great extent, a 
highly educated labor force, high levels of urbanization, and extended social programs. 
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
This study introduces the idea that institutional grafting is shaped by three forces: 
cultural, structural, and political. The success of institutional reforms is viewed as dependent 
not only on the actual quality of newly introduced legal institutions but also on the level of 
incongruence that these institutions develop to the three dimensions. The potential size of this 
incongruence is considered a function of the phase in which such institutions emerge. Drift-
phase institutional change produces legal institutions that are congruent with the logic of the 
three dimensions and that promote economic development. Path-breaking institutional change 
in contrast leads to the emergence of institutions that develop distances to the defined 
dimensions and that, thereby, have only a limited impact on growth rates. In this case, the 
actual quality of the political dimension will predetermine both a local economy's growth 
dynamics and the success of institutional change.  
Future research is needed to eliminate three major limitations of our study. First, a 
more careful grouping of countries for both subsamples is necessary to eliminate stark 
heterogeneities in their political, economic, social, and historical characteristics. Second, one 
should consider integrating countries with unstable regime trends into the analysis. Finally, 
alternative economic development measures should be used to demonstrate the robustness of 
our findings on the impact that the mode of institution building has on patterns of economic 
progress in the world. 
 
THE IMPACT OF VARIATIONS IN INSTITUTIONAL GRAFTING MODES ON 
GROWTH                                                                                                                                27                                                                                                                                  
 
References 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2001). The colonial origins of comparative 
development: An empirical investigation. American Economic Review, 91(5), 1369–
1401. 
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J.A. (2012). Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity 
and poverty.  New York: Crown Publishers. 
Arellano, M., & Bover, O. (1995). Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of 
error-component model. Journal of Econometrics, 68(1), 29–51. 
Aslund, A. (2007). How capitalism was built: The transformation of Central and Eastern 
Europe, Russia and Central Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Barro, R.J. (1997). Determinants of economic growth: A cross-country empirical study. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Berg, A., Borensztein, E., Sahay, R., & Zettelmeyer, J. (1999). The evolution of output in 
transition economies: Explaining the differences. IMF Working Paper WP/99/73, 
International Monetary Fund. 
Blundell, R., & Bond, S. (1998). Initial conditions and moment conditions in dynamic panel 
data models. Journal of Econometrics, 87(1), 115–143. 
Boettke, P.J., Coyne, C.J., & Leeson, P.T. (2008). Institutional stickiness and the new 
development economics. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 67(2), 331–
358.  
Bosworth, B.P., & Collins, S.M. (2003). The empirics of growth: An update. Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 113–206.  
Dattels, P., & Miyajima, K. (2009). Will emerging markets remain resilient to global stress? 
Global Journal of Emerging Market Economies, 1(1), 5–24. 
THE IMPACT OF VARIATIONS IN INSTITUTIONAL GRAFTING MODES ON 
GROWTH                                                                                                                                28                                                                                                                                  
 
Davis, L.S. (2010). Institutional flexibility and economic growth. Journal of Comparative 
Economics, 38(3), 306–320. 
De Melo, M., Denizer, C., Gelb, A., & Tenev, S. (1997). Circumstances and choice: The role 
of initial conditions and policies in transition economies. World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 1866, World Bank. 
Dementiev, V., & Vishnevskiy, V. (2011). Pochemu Ukraina ne innovatsionnoe gosudarstvo: 
Institutsionalniy analiz. Ekonomitseskaya Teoria (Why Ukraine is not an innovative 
state: Institutional analysis. Journal of Econometric Theory) 3, 5–20. 
Eggertsson, T. (1997). The old theory of economic policy and the New Institutionalism. 
World Development, 25(8), 1187–1203.  
Eicher, T.S., & Leukert, A.  (2009). Institutions and economic performance: Endogeneity and 
parameters heterogeneity.  Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 41(1), 197–218.  
Eicher, T.S., & Schreiber, T. (2010). Structural policies and growth: Time series evidence 
from a natural experiment.  Journal of Development Economics, 91(1), 169–179.  
Emara, N. (2012). Inflation volatility, institutions and economic growth. Global Journal of 
Emerging Market Economies, 4(1), 29–53. 
Falcetti, E., Raiser, M., & Sanfey, P. (2000). Defying the odds: Initial conditions, reforms 
and growth in the first decade of transition. EBRD Working Paper No. 55, European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Fidrmuc, J., & Tichit, A. (2009). Mind the break! Accounting for changing patterns of growth 
during transition. Economic Systems, 33(2), 138–154.  
Fidrmuc, J. (2003). Economic reform, democracy and growth during Post-Communist 
transition. European Journal of Political Economy, 19(3), 583–604. 
Fischer, S., Sahay R., & Vegh, C.A. (1996). Stabilisation and growth in transition economies: 
The early experience.  Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10, 45–66. 
THE IMPACT OF VARIATIONS IN INSTITUTIONAL GRAFTING MODES ON 
GROWTH                                                                                                                                29                                                                                                                                  
 
Gwartney, J., Lawson, R., Sobel, R.S., & Leeson, P.T. (2007). Economic freedom of the 
World: 2007 Annual Report. The Fraser Institute, Economic Freedom Network. 
Islam, N. (2004). Settler mortality rate as an instrument for institutional quality. Working 
Paper Series Vol. 2004-28, International Centre for the Study of East Asian 
Development. 
Jong-A-Pin, R. (2009). On the measurement of political instability and its impact on 
economic growth. European Journal of Political Economy, 25(1), 15–29. 
Kyriazis, N.C., & Zouboulakis, M.S. (2005). Modeling institutional change in transition 
countries. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 38(1), 109–120.  
Lee, K., & Kim, B.-Y. (2009). Both institutions and policies matter but differently for 
different income groups of countries: Determinants of long-run economic growth 
revisited. World Development, 37(3), 533–549.  
Mankiw, N.G., Romer, D., & Weil, D.N. (1992). A contribution to the empirics of economic 
growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(2), 407–437. 
Маu, V. (2008). Ekonomicheskaya politika 2007 goda: Uspehi i riski. Voprosi Ekonomiki 
(Economic policy in 2007: Successes and risks. Economic Issues). 2, 23–38.  
Nelson, R.R., & Sampat, B.N. (2001). Making sense of institutions as a factor shaping 
economic performance. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 44(1), 31–
54.  
North, D.C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Olson, M. (1982). The rise and decline of nations. Economic growth, stagnation and social 
rigidities. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Pääkkönen, J. (2010). Economic freedom as driver of growth in transition. Economic 
Systems, 34(4), 469–479.  
THE IMPACT OF VARIATIONS IN INSTITUTIONAL GRAFTING MODES ON 
GROWTH                                                                                                                                30                                                                                                                                  
 
Pejovich, S. (1999). The effects of the interaction of formal and informal institutions on 
social stability and economic development. Journal of Markets and Morality, 2(2), 
164–181.   
Polischuk, L. (2008). Nezelevoe ispolsovanie institutov: Prichini i sledstviya. Voprosi 
Ekonomiki (Non-intentional use of institutions: Causes and consequences. Economic 
Issues), 8, 28–44. 
Polterovich, V. (2008). Strategii modernizasii, instituti i coalisii. Voprosi Ekonomiki 
(Modernization strategies, institutions and coalitions. Economic Issues), 4, 4–24. 
Polterovich, V., & Popov, V.  (2006). Evoluzionnaya teoria ekonomicheskoy politiki. 
Voprosi Ekonomiki (Evolutionary theory of economic policy-making. Economic 
Issues), 7, 4–22. 
Portes, A. (2006). Institutions and development: A conceptual re-analysis. Population and 
Development Review, 32(2), 233–262.  
Przeworski, A., & Limongi, F. (1993). Political regimes and economic growth. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 7(3), 51–69. 
Solow, R. M. (1956). A contribution to the theory of economic growth. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 70(1), 65–94. 
Tabellini, G.  (2008). The scope of cooperation: Values and incentives. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 123(3), 905–950.  
Vernikov, A. (2009). Corporate governance institutions in Russia: Import and mutation. 
Working Paper 15379, Munich Personal RePEc Archive.   
Yasin, E.G. (2003). Modernizatsia ekonomiki i sistema tsennostey (Economy modernization 
and values system). Retrieved from: http://www.amicable.ru/library/yasin2003.pdf. 
  
 
  
Table 1 
 Factor Loading and Unique Variances for Political Scores  
VARIABLE   Factor Uniqueness 
Voice and accountability  0.894 0.162 
Government effectiveness  0.972 0.038 
Regulatory quality 0.953 0.073 
Corruption control in government  0.948 0.065 
 
  
 
Table 2  
 
Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables of the Extended Subsamples 
 
VARIABLES No. of 
observatio
ns 
Mean SD Min. Max. 
The extended drift subsample       
GDP per capita growth 528 2.839 3.521 -5.930 31.800 
Legal institutions  426 0.720 0.193 0.125 1.000 
The political dimension       
Democratic settings quality 440   0.658 0.274 0.118 1.000 
Policymaking quality 449 0.631 0.241 0.098 1.000 
The cultural dimension  300 0.418 0.258 0.070 1.000 
The structural dimension Not available 
Distance to the political dimension      
Distance to democratic settings quality 384 0.276 0.745 -0.437 4.214 
Distance to policymaking quality 383 0.175 0.312 -0.562 1.873 
Distance to the cultural dimension 236 1.501 1.666 -0.483 7.613 
Distance to the structural dimension Not available 
Corruption perception index 462 6.236 2.436 1.400 10.000 
Gross capital formation 534 23.277 8.185 8.000 114.000 
Inflation 526 4.129 4.740 -13.800 34.700 
Life expectancy 540 73.156 9.054 35.000 85.000 
Legal institutional change 383 0.017 0.179 -0.767 1.422 
Latitude 540  0.373 0.202 0.014 0.711 
The extended path-breaking subsample      
GDP per capita growth 492    3.648 4.319 -17.690 26.000 
Legal institutions 369 0.532 0.126 0.198 0.906 
The political dimension      
Democratic settings quality 420 0.587 0.147 0.212 0.851 
Policymaking quality 418 0.414 0.128 0.194 0.713 
The cultural dimension 384  0.279 0.163 0.095 0.825 
The structural dimension 252 0.683 0.186 0.000 1.000 
Distance to the political dimension      
Distance to democratic settings quality 337 -0.087 0.272 -0.622 1.681 
Distance to policymaking quality 336 0.312 0.343 -0.344 1.403 
Distance to the cultural dimension  284   1.605 1.472 -0.596 5.485 
Distance to the structural dimension  174    -0.187 0.169 -0.585 0.711 
Corruption perception index 397 3.395 1.164 0.400 6.900 
Gross capital formation 502 23.476 7.110 6.000 75.000 
Inflation 502 9.894 13.061 -9.600 121.600 
Life expectancy 504 67.486 8.681 41.000 80.000 
Legal institutional change 327 0.030 0.185 -0.432 1.595 
Latitude 492   0.368 0.185  0.056 0.667 
Note. The legal institutional scores and the three dimensions' variables are rescaled to vary between 0 and 1. 
The minimum and maximum values of the respective variables from the pooled sample are used as benchmarks 
for rescaling. 
  
 
Table 3  
 
Mean Values for the Distance Variables, by Mode of Institutional Grafting 
 
VARIABLES The drift subsample The path-breaking subsample 
Base Extended  Base Extended  
Distance to the political dimension     
Distance to democratic settings 
quality 
0.087 0.276 -0.017 -0.087 
Distance to policymaking quality 0.084 0.175 0.305 0.312 
Distance to the cultural dimension 1.037 1.501 1.682 1.605 
Distance to the structural dimension Not available Not available   -0.187 Not available 
 
  
 
Table 4 
 
 The Impact of the Distance Variables on Economic Growth for the Base Subsamples 
VARIABLES The base path-breaking subsample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Ln(Growth rate)t-1 0.098*** 0.028 -0.060 0.056*** 
 (0.025) (0.049) (0.044) (0.015) 
Ln(Capital) 0.563*** 0.211 0.506*** 0.247** 
 (0.049) (0.151) (0.153) (0.118) 
Ln(Inflation) -0.133*** -0.108*** -0.079*** -0.115*** 
 (0.019) (0.028) (0.022) (0.013) 
Distance to the Cultural dimension  -0.141***    
 (0.042)    
Distance to the Political dimension     
Distance to Democratic settings quality  -0.183*   
  (0.089)   
Distance to Policymaking quality    -0.317***  
   (0.082)  
Distance to the Structural dimension    -0.598** 
    (0.223) 
     
Number of instruments  21 19 19 21 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions (Prob > 
chi2) 
0.424 0.322 0.269 0.410 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)(Pr > z) 0.322 0.453 0.458 0.252 
Number of observations 130 105 105 130 
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. Results are only reported for the base path-breaking subsample. We do not 
run a similar analysis for the base drift subsample due to a great number of missing values for the cultural 
variable and the lack of data for the structural variable. All the variables specified in the model are included in 
the gmmstyle option. Instruments are restricted to the first, second and third lags of the respective variables; 
time dummies appear in the ivstyle option.  
*p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.
  
Table 5 
The Impact of the Distance Variables on Economic Growth for the Extended Subsamples 
VARIABLES The extended drift subsample The extended path-breaking subsample  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Ln(Growth rate)t-1 -0.145*** -0.216*** 0.098*** 0.021 0.245*** 0.254*** 
 (0.041) (0.004) (0.034) (0.051) (0.043) (0.046) 
Ln(Capital) 2.771*** 3.498*** 2.084*** 0.068 0.978*** 0.614* 
 (0.658) (0.274) (0.581) (0.174) (0.332) (0.304) 
Ln(Inflation) -0.396*** -0.307*** -0.336*** -0.158*** -0.039 -0.113*** 
 (0.103) (0.030) (0.064) (0.032) (0.053) (0.036) 
Distance to the Cultural dimension  -0.610***   0.448***   
 (0.086)   (0.088)   
Distance to the Political dimension       
Distance to Democratic settings quality  -0.222***   -0.702**  
  (0.033)   (0.282)  
Distance to Policy-making quality    -1.082***   0.378* 
   (0.373)   (0.197) 
Number of instruments  21 35 27 29 27 27 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions (Prob > 
chi2) 
0.383 0.278 0.404 0.451 0.192 0.136 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)(Pr > z) 0.547 0.223 0.390 0.105 0.566 0.354 
Number of observations       
Number of countries 140 186 186 192 190 190 
Number of instruments  24 42 42 32 40 40 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. All the variables specified in the model are included in the gmmstyle option; time dummies appear in the ivstyle option. Column (1): 
Instruments are restricted to the first, second and third lags of the respective variables; Column (2): Instruments are increased to the seventh lags of the respective variables; 
Column (3): Instruments used are from the second to the sixth lags of the respective variables; Columns (4, 5 and 6): Instruments used are from the fifth to the ninth lags of 
the respective variables.  
*p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01. 
  
Table 6 
 
The Impact of Legal Institutions on Economic Growth for the Base Subsamples  
 
VARIABLES The base drift subsample The base path-breaking subsample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
         
Ln(Growth rate)t-1 0.113 -0.095*** 0.216** 0.121 0.069 0.166*** 0.077 0.214 
 (0.133) (0.019) (0.083) (0.141) (0.061) (0.036) (0.070) (0.137) 
Ln(Capital) 3.790*** 4.154*** 3.340*** 4.813** -0.500 -0.475 0.508* -0.492 
 (1.303) (0.537) (1.106) (2.018) (0.517) (0.295) (0.282) (0.544) 
Ln(Inflation) -0.343 -0.490*** -0.514*** -0.744** -0.059 -0.083** -0.255*** -0.120** 
 (0.214) (0.084) (0.148) (0.316) (0.044) (0.034) (0.051) (0.053) 
Legal institutions 10.440*** 2.098** 9.473*** 6.705* -0.630 0.759*** 0.421 1.146** 
 (2.867) (1.008) (2.400) (3.574) (0.871) (0.208) (0.571) (0.475) 
         
Number of instruments  13 21 17 13 13 21 17 13 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions 
(Prob > chi2) 
0.252 0.507 0.239 0.123 0.196 0.333 0.178 0.140 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)(Pr > z) 0.462 0.104 0.567 0.287 0.289 0.304 0.221 0.347 
Number of observations 128 128 128 128 130 130 130 130 
Number of countries 22 22 22 22 21 21 21 21 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. Column (1): All the variables specified in the model are included in the gmmstyle option. Instruments are restricted to the third, 
fourth and fifth lags of the respective variables; Column (2): In addition to the above specification choice, time dummies appear in the ivstyle option; Column (3): An 
alternative model specification choice is used such as restricting instruments to the ninth and tenth lags of the respective variables; Column (4): An alternative model 
specification choice is used such as restricting instruments to the fifth lags of the respective variables and omitting the collapse sub-option. 
*p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01. 
  
 
Table 7 
 
The Impact of Legal Institutions on Economic Growth for the Extended Subsamples 
 
VARIABLES The extended drift subsample The extended path-breaking subsample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
         
Ln(Growth rate)t-1 -0.098 -0.227*** 0.071* -0.205*** 0.011 0.060*** -0.012 0.033* 
 (0.064) (0.011) (0.037) (0.011) (0.074) (0.020) (0.076) (0.019) 
Ln(Capital) 3.294*** 3.021*** 3.063*** 2.451*** 0.628 0.701** 0.933** -0.002 
 (0.801) (0.384) (0.848) (0.611) (0.441) (0.289) (0.425) (0.092) 
Ln(Inflation) -0.485*** -0.491*** -0.433*** -0.357*** -0.085 -0.081** -0.084* -0.143*** 
 (0.120) (0.099) (0.130) (0.042) (0.060) (0.031) (0.044) (0.024) 
Legal institutions 1.883* 3.717*** 4.623*** 2.361*** 1.876** 1.656*** 1.497** 1.915*** 
 (0.933) (0.550) (0.799) (0.311) (0.693) (0.414) (0.594) (0.331) 
         
Number of instruments  26 35 26 33 26 35 26 33 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions (Prob > chi2) 0.292 0.348 0.209 0.567 0.125 0.338 0.123 0.214 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)(Pr > z) 0.319 0.195 0.815 0.209 0.092 0.103 0.153 0.106 
Number of observations 236 236 190 190 227 227 213 213 
Number of countries 42 42 33 33 40 40 37 37 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. Column (1): All the variables specified in the model are included in the gmmstyle option. Instruments are restricted to the ninth 
and tenth lags of the respective variables. The collapse sub-option is not included. Time dummies appear in the ivstyle option; Column (2): An alternative model 
specification choice is used such as restricting instruments to the sixth lags of the respective variables and including the collapse sub-option; Column (3): Resource rich 
countries are excluded from the analysis; specification choice of Model 1 is applied; Column (4): Resource rich countries are excluded from the analysis; the 
specification choice from Model 2 is applied with the collapse suboption added in order to keep the number of instruments less than the number of countries. 
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.  
  
 Table 8 
 
 Extended Analysis of Legal Institutional Effects on Growth Rates for the Base Path-Breaking Subsample  
 
VARIABLES The base path-breaking subsample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Ln(Growth rate)t-1 0.295*** 0.336*** 0.138*** 0.166*** 
 (0.098) (0.065) (0.028) (0.049) 
Ln(Capital) 0.033 0.073 -0.382*** -0.689** 
 (0.323) (0.345) (0.126) (0.273) 
Ln(Inflation) -0.314*** -0.172*** -0.146*** -0.145*** 
 (0.066) (0.055) (0.039) (0.048) 
Legal institutions t-1 1.448***    
 (0.468)    
Legal institutions  -19.823*** -0.295 -4.390* 
  (3.459) (0.393) (2.141) 
Legal institutions _2  20.479***   
  (3.560)   
Cpi   0.423*** -0.424 
   (0.130) (0.439) 
Cpi * Legal institutions    1.375* 
    (0.662) 
Number of instruments  16 19 19 19  
Hansen test of overid. restrictions (Prob > chi2) 0.159 0.365 0.494 0.410 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)(Pr > z) 0.713 0.724 0.413 0.428 
Number of observations 113 130 126 126 
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. All the variables specified in the model are included in the gmmstyle option. Instruments are restricted only to the second or third 
lags of the respective variables. The collapse sub-option is included. Time dummies appear in the ivstyle option. 
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01. 
 
  
 
Table 9 
 
Extended Analysis of Legal Institutional Effects on Growth Rates for the Extended Path-Breaking Subsample  
 
VARIABLES The extended path-breaking subsample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Ln(Growth rate)t-1 0.281*** 0.395*** 0.292*** 0.308*** 
 (0.053) (0.091) (0.066) (0.082) 
Ln(Capital) -0.279 -0.369 -0.465 -0.425 
 (0.291) (0.386) (0.319) (0.307) 
Ln(Inflation) -0.242*** -0.165* -0.037 -0.053 
 (0.050) (0.087) (0.062) (0.078) 
Legal institutions t-1 3.019***    
 (0.385)    
Legal institutions  -17.38* 1.170 0.357 
  (10.290) (1.064) (3.554) 
Legal institutions _2  19.010*   
  (10.660)   
Cpi   0.120 -0.116 
   (0.224) (0.842) 
Cpi * Legal institutions    0.320 
    (1.237) 
     
Number of instruments  28 17 19 19 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions (Prob > chi2) 0.196 0.171 0.104 0.092 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)(Pr > z) 0.984 0.797 0.249 0.346 
Number of observations 203 227 214 214 
Number of countries 40 40 40 40 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. All the variables specified in the model are included in the gmmstyle option. Instruments are restricted to the second, third, 
fourth, fifth and sixth lags of the respective variables for Column 1 and to the second and third lags of the respective variables for Columns 2, 3, and 4. The collapse 
sub-option is included. Time dummies appear in the ivstyle option. 
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01. 
  
Table 10 
 
 The Impact of Democratic Settings Quality on Economic Growth for the Base Subsamples 
  
VARIABLES The base drift subsample The base path-breaking subsample 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
       
Ln(Growth rate)t-1 -0.087*** -0.144*** -0.599*** -0.167 -0.021* 0.464** 
 (0.029) (0.011) (0.116) (0.099) (0.011) (0.195) 
Ln(Capital) -0.436 1.279** 7.508*** -0.205 0.429*** 1.374*** 
 (1.168) (0.609) (0.930) (0.360) (0.062) (0.441) 
Ln(Inflation) -0.118 -0.349*** -0.421*** -0.039 -0.113*** -0.455*** 
 (0.101) (0.066) (0.137) (0.034) (0.026) (0.117) 
Democratic settings quality 11.280*** 3.188* 4.542** 4.608 1.068 2.125** 
 (2.194) (1.733) (1.826) (5.167) (1.547) (0.770) 
       
Number of instruments  13 19 15 13 19 15 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions 
(Prob > chi2) 
0.123 0.359 0.329 0.066 0.243 0.124 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)(Pr > 
z) 
0.110 0.079 0.107 0.122 0.338 0.636 
Number of observations 100 100 100 116 116 116 
Number of countries 22 22 22 21 21 21 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. Column (1): All the variables specified in the model are included in the gmmstyle option. Instruments are restricted to the first, 
second and third lags of the respective variables; (2) Additionally, time dummies appear in the ivstyle option; (3) An alternative model specification choice is used 
such as restricting instruments only to the tenth lags of the respective variables and omitting the collapse sub-option. 
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.  
  
 
Table 11  
 
The Impact of Democratic Settings Quality on Economic Growth for the Extended Subsamples  
 
VARIABLES The extended drift subsample The extended path-breaking subsample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
         
Ln(Growth rate)t-1 -0.200*** -0.191*** -0.214*** -0.219*** -0.057* -0.062*** -0.043 0.037 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.021) (0.003) (0.029) (0.018) (0.038) (0.034) 
Ln(Capital) 2.119*** 2.736*** 2.875*** 4.198*** 0.150 0.036 0.204 0.085 
 (0.626) (0.219) (0.767) (0.204) (0.137) (0.023) (0.185) (0.112) 
Ln(Inflation) -0.224*** -0.253*** -0.297*** -0.254*** -0.032 -0.037*** -0.083*** -0.076*** 
 (0.052) (0.035) (0.072) (0.022) (0.021) (0.012) (0.030) (0.020) 
Democratic settings quality 3.236*** 3.320*** 4.403*** 3.140*** 7.139*** 8.230*** 7.847*** 4.341*** 
 (0.546) (0.389) (1.269) (0.533) (1.469) (0.747) (2.029) (0.743) 
         
Number of instruments  33 39 23 31 33 39 23 31 
Hansen test of overid. 
restrictions (Prob > chi2) 
0.417 0.268 0.321 0.371 0.238 0.433 0.142 0.154 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2)(Pr > z) 
0.153 0.183 0.202 0.370 0.482 0.467 0.566 0.273 
Number of observations 191 191 191 148 205 205 205 190 
Number of countries 43 43 43 33 40 40 40 37 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. Column (1): All the variables specified in the model are included in the gmmstyle option. Instruments used are from the first to 
the eighth lags of the respective variables; Column (2): Additionally, time dummies appear in the ivstyle option; Column (3) An alternative model specification choice 
is used such as reducing the instruments to the fourth lags of the respective variables; Column (4): Resource rich countries are omitted from the analysis, the 
specification choice from Model 2 is applied with instruments reduced to the sixth lags of the respective variables.  
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.  
  
 
Table 12 
 The Impact of Policymaking Quality on Economic Growth for the Base Subsamples 
VARIABLES The base drift subsample The base path-breaking subsample 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
       
Ln(Growth rate)t-1 -0.069 0.052 0.189*** 0.205 0.313*** 0.284*** 
 (0.147) (0.054) (0.009) (0.199) (0.091) (0.053) 
Ln(Capital) 4.021 2.357** 2.336*** -1.518* 0.022 0.124 
 (2.362) (1.028) (0.669) (0.780) (0.194) (0.157) 
Ln(Inflation) -1.146** -0.679*** -0.798*** -0.088 -0.227** -0.296*** 
 (0.527) (0.207) (0.055) (0.139) (0.091) (0.057) 
Policymaking quality -27.220* -1.470 -0.422 9.058** 3.765** 5.715*** 
 (15.560) (3.543) (2.225) (3.893) (1.529) (0.991) 
       
Number of instruments  9 15 19 9 15 19 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions (Prob > 
chi2) 
0.375 0.371 0.354 0.160 0.161 0.248 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)(Pr > z) 0.348 0.141 0.210 0.616 0.736 0.532 
Number of observations 100 100 100 116 116 116 
Number of countries 22 22 22 21 21 21 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. Column (1): All the variables specified in the model are included in the gmmstyle option. Instruments are restricted to the second 
and third lags of the respective variables; Column (2): Additionally, time dummies appear in the ivstyle option; Column (3): An alternative model specification choice 
is used such as increasing instruments to the fourth lags of the respective variables. 
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.  
  
 
Table 13 
 The Impact of Policymaking Quality on Economic Growth for the Extended Subsamples 
VARIABLES The extended drift subsample The extended path-breaking subsample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
         
Ln(Growth rate)t-1 -0.263*** -0.065*** -0.079*** -0.007 -0.019 0.199*** 0.025 0.217*** 
 (0.026) (0.018) (0.025) (0.008) (0.041) (0.010) (0.036) (0.032) 
Ln(Capital) 1.408*** 2.194*** 2.111*** 2.391*** 0.136 0.685*** 0.973*** 0.852*** 
 (0.393) (0.095) (0.166) (0.051) (0.099) (0.070) (0.117) (0.044) 
Ln(Inflation) -0.346*** -0.356*** -0.409*** -0.416*** -0.111*** -0.146*** -0.250*** -0.208*** 
 (0.068) (0.030) (0.066) (0.038) (0.025) (0.016) (0.037) (0.026) 
Policymaking quality -6.330*** 0.292 -0.895 1.157** 4.308*** 3.427*** 8.369*** 5.439*** 
 (2.085) (1.076) (1.310) (0.565) (1.063) (0.545) (1.481) (1.001) 
         
Number of instruments  27 39 34 34 27 39 34 34 
Hansen test of overid. 
restrictions (Prob > chi2) 
0.732 0.360 0.290 0.400 0.186 0.333 0.359 0.396 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2)(Pr > z) 
0.249 0.362 0.402 0.623 0.402 0.556 0.755 0.756 
Number of observations 194 194 194 151 205 205 205 190 
Number of countries 44 44 44 34 40 40 40 37 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. Column (1): All the variables specified in the model are included in the gmmstyle option. Instruments used are from the first to 
the fifth lags of the respective variables; Column (2): An alternative model specification choice is applied such as allowing instruments to vary from the third to the 
tenth lags of the respective variables; Column (3): An alternative model specification choice is used such as restricting instruments to the fourth lags of the respective 
variables and omitting the collapse suboption; Column (4): Resource rich countries are omitted from the analysis. 
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01. 
  
 
Table 14 
 
 The Impact of Changes in the Distance Variables on Economic Growth for the Path-Breaking Subsample 
VARIABLES The base path-breaking subsample The extended path-breaking subsample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln(Growth rate)t-1 0.184* 0.529*** 0.784 -0.005 -0.079*** 0.261*** 
 (0.094) (0.170) (0.516) (0.104) (0.028) (0.080) 
Democratic settings quality -0.824  9.319**  -1.077  
 (1.886)  (3.904)  (1.912)  
Policymaking quality  0.517  9.612***  -0.641 
  (4.302)  (2.909)  (2.684) 
D_Culture -0.210 -1.807   -0.045 -1.212** 
 (0.562) (1.276)   (0.360) (0.545) 
D_Culture* Democratic settings quality 0.791    1.279*  
 (0.973)    (0.641)  
D_Culture* Policymaking quality  4.222*    3.511** 
  (2.358)    (1.445) 
D_ Structure   -1.123 -3.986   
   (7.939) (3.564)   
D_Structure* Democratic settings quality   3.036    
   (15.980)    
D_Structure* Policymaking quality    11.060   
    (9.324)   
Number of instruments  17 12 12 17 27 22 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions (Prob > chi2) 0.538 0.134 0.305 0.186 0.197 0.134 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)(Pr > z) 0.151 0.490 0.413 0.396 0.163 0.958 
Number of observations 105 105 105 105 158 158 
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 32 32 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. The results for the control variables (lnCapital and lnInflation) are not reported due to space limits. Column (1): Instruments are 
restricted to the fifth and sixth lags of the respective variables; Column (2): Instruments are restricted to the second lags of the respective variables; Column (3): 
Instruments are restricted to the tenth lags of the respective variables; Column (4): Instruments are restricted to the fifth and sixth lags of the respective variables; 
Column (5): Instruments used are from the first to the fourth lags of the respective variables; Column (6): Instruments are restricted to the eighth, ninth and tenth lags 
of the respective variables.  * p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.  
  
 
Table 15 
 The Impact of the Political Dimension on Legal Institutional Change, by Mode of Institutional Grafting 
VARIABLES The drift subsample The path-breaking subsample 
Base Extended  Base Extended  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
         
Legal institutionst-1 -1.331*** -0.253** -0.880*** -0.588*** -1.561*** -1.397*** -1.943*** -1.869*** 
 (0.029) (0.099) (0.028) (0.092) (0.061) (0.116) (0.039) (0.109) 
Life expectancy -0.013*** -0.005*** 0.016*** 0.002 0.008 0.006 0.025*** 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) (0.003) (0.009) 
Democratic settings quality 0.509***  0.467***  -0.765**  0.271**  
 (0.120)  (0.031)  (0.337)  (0.132)  
Policymaking quality  0.127  -0.168  1.792***  1.807*** 
  (0.131)  (0.331)  (0.591)  (0.403) 
         
Number of instruments  18 14 38 22 18 14 38 22 
Hansen test of overid. 
restrictions (Prob > chi2) 
0.218 0.153 0.216 0.185 0.459 0.331 0.404 0.123 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2)(Pr > z) 
0.484 0.635 0.267 0.234 0.123 0.210 0.122 0.165 
Number of observations 132 132 256 256 102 102 219 219 
Number of countries 22 22 43 43 20 20 41 41 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. All the variables specified in the model are included in the gmmstyle option. Time dummies appear in the ivstyle option. 
Columns (1): Instruments are restricted to the first, second and third lags of the respective variables; Columns (2): Instruments are restricted to the second and third 
lags of the respective variables; Columns (3): Instruments used are from the third to the tenth lags of the respective variables; Columns (4): Instruments used are from 
the second to the fifth lags of the respective variables. 
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.  
  
Table 16 
 
The Impact of the Distance Variables on Legal Institutional Grafting for the Path-Breaking 
Subsample 
 
VARIABLES The base path-breaking subsample The extended path-
breaking subsample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Legal institutional change t-1 -0.295*** -0.304*** -0.254*** -0.213*** -0.304*** -0.279*** 
 (0.006) (0.026) (0.011) (0.021) (0.018) (0.012) 
Life expectancy -0.074*** -0.037*** 0.009 0.042** -0.024*** -0.013*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.005) (0.003) 
Democratic settings quality -2.539***  -0.656  -2.576***  
 (0.622)  (0.726)  (0.321)  
Policymaking quality  -5.444***  -1.844***  -2.998*** 
  (0.464)  (0.588)  (0.349) 
D_Culture -0.098 -0.557***   -0.055 -0.073 
 (0.141) (0.180)   (0.101) (0.065) 
D_Culture* 0.618**    0.445***  
Democratic settings quality (0.229)    (0.151)  
D_Culture*  1.626***    0.618*** 
Policymaking quality  (0.226)    (0.128) 
D_Structure   -1.716** -2.038**   
   (0.703) (0.755)   
D_Structure*   4.646***    
Democratic settings quality   (1.348)    
D_Structure*    7.362***   
Policymaking quality    (1.927)   
       
Number of instruments  19 19 19 19 27 27 
Hansen test of overid. 
restrictions (Prob > chi2) 
0.228 0.272 0.274 0.304 0.299 0.269 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2)(Pr > z) 
0.626 0.760 0.913 0.300 0.168 0.560 
Number of observations 96 96 96 96 162 162 
Number of countries 20 20 20 20 31 31 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. All the variables specified in the model are included in the gmmstyle 
option. Time dummies appear in the ivstyle option. We restrict instruments to the first, second and third lags of 
the respective variables for the base path-breaking subsample. In the case of the extended path-breaking 
subsample, instruments used are from the fifth to the ninth lags of the respective variables. 
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.  
  
Appendix 1 
 
Description of Country Choice for the Drift and Path-Breaking Subsamples 
Country Choice Notes 
Afghanistan Not included  Recent history of military intervention  
Albania  Included in the path-breaking sample  
Algeria  Not included  Fluctuations in regime trend greater 
than 3 points 
Angola  Not included Insufficient change (the benchmark of 
6 not reached) 
Argentina  Included in the path-breaking sample  
Armenia  Included in the path-breaking sample History of reverse trend but included 
due to the insufficient number of 
transition countries in the base 
subsample  
Australia  Included in the drift sample Resource rich 
Austria Included in the drift sample  
Azerbaijan  Included in the path-breaking sample History of reverse trend but included 
due to the insufficient number of 
transition countries in the base 
subsample 
Bahrain  Included in the drift sample Resource rich  
Bangladesh  Included in the path-breaking sample Fluctuations in regime trend greater 
than 3 points but after 2006. Starting 
point of change is slightly above -6 
Belarus  Not included  Recursive movement to autocracy 
Belgium  Included in the drift sample  
Benin  Included in the path-breaking sample  
Bhutan  Not included Fluctuations in regime trend greater 
than 3 points 
Bolivia  Included in the path-breaking sample  
Bosnia Not included No data on polity scores 
Botswana  Included in the drift sample  
Brazil   Included in the path-breaking sample Profound political change occurs but in 
stages. Resource rich 
Bulgaria  Included in the path-breaking sample  
Burkina Faso  Not included Fluctuations in regime trend greater 
than 3 points 
Burundi Not included Mixed change, difficult to classify 
Cambodia Not included Insufficient and unstable change 
Cameroon  Included in the drift sample  
Canada  Included in the drift sample Resource rich 
Cape Verde Not included Insufficient starting point for change 
(above -6) 
Cen. Afr. Rep. Not included Insufficient change  
Chad Not included Insufficient change 
Chile  Not included A lot of missing values on key 
variables 
China Included in the drift sample Resource rich 
Colombia Included in the drift sample  
Comoros Not included Fluctuations in regime trend greater 
than 3 points 
Congo Not included Insufficient and unstable change 
Costa Rica Included in the drift sample  
Croatia Included in the path-breaking sample Starting point of change is slightly 
above -6 
Cuba Not included A lot of missing values on key 
  
variables 
Cyprus Not included Insufficient history of regime trend  
Czech Republic Included in the path-breaking sample   
Denmark Included in the drift sample  
Djibouti  Not included Insufficient change  
Dominican Republic  Not included Fluctuations in regime trend greater 
than 3 points   
Congo Kinshasa  Not included Insufficient change 
East Timor  Not included Insufficient history of regime trend 
available  
Ecuador  Not included Insufficient starting point for change 
(above -6) 
Egypt  Included in the drift sample  
El Salvador  Included in the path-breaking sample Change is in the early 1980s and is 
relatively durable 
Equatorial Guinea  Included in the drift sample  
Eritrea Not included Insufficient history of regime trend 
available 
Estonia  Included in the path-breaking sample  
Ethiopia  Not included Insufficient change 
Fiji Not included Fluctuations in regime trend greater 
than 3 points   
Finland  Included in the drift sample  
France  Included in the drift sample  
Gabon  Not included Insufficient change  
Gambia  Not included Change is from democracy to 
autocracy  
Georgia  Included in the path-breaking sample  
Germany  Included in the drift sample  
Ghana  Not included Fluctuations in regime trend greater 
than 3 points   
Greece  Included in the drift sample  
Guatemala  Included in the path-breaking sample Full transition is reached but in two 
phases with few years apart 
Guinea-Bissau  Not included Unstable change 
Guinea  Included in the drift sample Resource rich 
Guyana  Included in the path-breaking sample Resource rich 
Haiti  Not included Fluctuations in regime trend greater 
than 3 points   
Honduras  Not included Insufficient starting point for change 
(above -6) 
Hungary  Included in the path-breaking sample  
India  Included in the drift sample  
Indonesia  Included in the path-breaking sample Change is relatively recent (around 
2000) 
Iran  Not included Unstable change  
Iraq Not included Recent history of military occupation  
Ireland  Included in the drift sample  
Israel  Included in the drift sample  
Italy  Included in the drift sample  
Ivory Cost  Not included Insufficient change (the benchmark of 
6 not reached) 
Jamaica  Included in the drift sample  
Japan  Included in the drift sample  
Jordan  Not included Fluctuations in regime trend greater 
than 3 points   
Kazakhstan  Not included No transition to democracy  
Kenya  Not included Mixed change, difficult to classify 
  
Korea North  Not included A lot of missing values on key 
variables  
Korea South  Included in the path-breaking sample Starting point for change is slightly 
above -6 
Kosovo  Not included  Insufficient history of regime trend  
Kuwait  Not included  
Kyrgyzstan  Included in the path-breaking sample Insufficient change (the benchmark of 
6 not reached) but included due to the 
insufficient number of transition 
countries in the base subsample 
Laos Not included  Change is from democracy to 
autocracy  
Latvia  Included in the path-breaking sample  
Lebanon  Not included Recent history of military occupation  
Lesotho  Included in the path-breaking sample Change is around mid of 1990s. Recent 
experience with democracy prior to 
change. Resource rich 
Liberia Not included A lot of missing values on key 
variables 
Libya Not included A lot of missing values on key 
variables 
Lithuania  Included in the path-breaking sample  
Luxembourg  Included in the drift sample Marked as small economy 
Macedonia  Included in the path-breaking sample  
Madagascar  Included in the path-breaking sample Reverse trend but after 2006 
Malawi Included in the path-breaking sample  
Malaysia  Not included Fluctuations in regime trend greater 
than 3 points   
Mali  Included in the path-breaking sample  
Mauritania  Not included Fluctuations in regime trend greater 
than 3 points   
Mauritius  Included in the drift sample  
Mexico  Included in the drift sample Resource rich 
Moldova  Included in the path-breaking sample  
Mongolia  Included in the path-breaking sample  
Montenegro  Not included Insufficient history of regime trend 
Morocco Included in the drift sample  
Mozambique  Included in the path-breaking sample The upper benchmark of 6 is slightly 
not reached). Change is around mid of 
1990s.   
Myanmar  Not included A lot of missing values on key 
variables 
Namibia Not included Insufficient history of regime trend 
Nepal Not included Fluctuations in regime trend greater 
than 3 points   
Netherlands, the  Included in the drift sample  
New Zealand  Included in the drift sample  
Nicaragua  Not included Mixed change, difficult to classify 
Niger  Not included Unstable change  
Nigeria  Not included Unstable change 
Norway  Included in the drift sample Resource rich 
Oman  Included in the drift sample Resource rich  
Pakistan  Not included Fluctuations in regime trend greater 
than 3 points   
Panama Included in the path-breaking sample  
Papua N. G.  Not included Insufficient history of regime trend 
Paraguay  Included in the path-breaking sample  
Peru  Not included Fluctuations in regime trend greater 
  
than 3 points   
Philippines  Included in the path-breaking sample  
Poland  Included in the path-breaking sample  
Portugal  Included in the drift sample Change is shortly after 1970 
Qatar  Not included A lot of missing values on key 
variables 
Romania  Included in the path-breaking sample  
Russia  Included in the path-breaking sample Resource rich, Fluctuations in regime 
trend  but the country is retained for the 
analysis due to the insufficient number 
of transition countries in the subsample 
Rwanda  Included in the drift sample  
Saudi Arabia  Included in the drift sample Resource rich  
Senegal  Not included A lot of missing values on key 
variables 
Serbia  Included in the path-breaking sample  
Sierra Leone  Not included Mixed change, difficult to classify 
Singapore  Included in the drift sample  
Slovak Rep.  Included in the path-breaking sample  
Slovenia  Included in the path-breaking sample  
Solomon Isl.  Not included Insufficient history of regime trend 
Somalia  Not included Mixed change, difficult to classify 
South Africa  Not included Insufficient starting point for change 
(above -6) 
South Sudan  Not included No data on regime trend are available  
Spain  Not included A lot of missing values on key 
variables 
Sri Lanka Included in the drift sample Mild fluctuations in regime trend  
Sudan  Not included Fluctuations in regime trend greater 
than 3 points   
Suriname  Not included No data on regime trend are available  
Swaziland  Not included Mixed change, difficult to classify 
Sweden  Included in the drift sample  
Switzerland  Included in the drift sample  
Syria  Included in the drift sample Fluctuations in regime trend prior 1970 
Taiwan  Not included Change is in many stages  
Tajikistan  Not included Insufficient political change (the upper 
benchmark of 6 not reached) 
Tanzania  Not included Insufficient change 
Thailand  Not included Fluctuations in regime trend greater 
than  3 points   
Togo Not included Insufficient change (the upper 
benchmark of 6 not reached) 
Trinidad  Included in the drift sample  
Tunisia  Included in the drift sample Gradual change 
Turkey Not included Fluctuations in regime trend greater 
than 3 points   
Turkmenistan  Not included No transition to democracy  
UAE Not included Insufficient history of regime trend 
Uganda  Not included Fluctuations in regime trend greater 
than 3 points   
Ukraine  Included in the path-breaking sample  
United Kingdom, the  Included in the drift sample  
United States, the  Included in the drift sample Resource rich 
Uruguay  Included in the path-breaking sample Brief history of reverse trend shortly 
after 1970  
Uzbekistan  Not included No transition to democracy  
Venezuela  Not included Change is from democracy to 
  
Note. List of countries is sourced from http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. 
autocracy  
Vietnam  Included in the drift sample  
Yemen  Not included Fluctuations in regime trend greater 
than 3 points   
Zambia  Included in the path-breaking sample Brief history of reverse trend  
Zimbabwe  Not included  Change is from democracy to 
autocracy 
  
Appendix 2 
 
List of Countries Used in the Analysis 
 
Drift-phase subsamples Path-breaking subsamples 
Base Extended Base Extended 
Australia  Australia  Albania  Albania  
Austria  Austria  Armenia Argentina  
Belgium  Bahrain  Azerbaijan Armenia 
China  Belgium  Bulgaria  Azerbaijan 
Colombia  Botswana Croatia Bangladesh 
Costa Rica  Cameroon  Czech Republic  Benin 
Denmark  Canada Estonia Bolivia 
Finland  China  Georgia Brazil  
Germany  Colombia  Hungary Bulgaria  
India Costa Rica  Kyrgyzstan  Croatia 
Ireland  Denmark  Latvia  Czech Republic  
Israel Egypt Lithuania  El Salvador  
Italy  Equatorial Guinea  Macedonia  Estonia 
Jamaica Finland  Moldova  Georgia 
Japan France  Poland Guatemala 
Netherlands, the   Germany  Romania  Guyana  
New Zealand  Greece  Russia  Hungary 
Norway  Guinea Serbia  Indonesia 
Sweden  India Slovakia  Korea South  
Switzerland  Ireland  Slovenia  Kyrgyzstan  
United Kingdom, the   Israel Ukraine  Latvia  
United States, the  Italy   Lesotho  
 Jamaica  Lithuania  
 Japan  Macedonia  
 Luxembourg   Madagascar  
 Mauritius   Malawi 
 Mexico  Mali  
 Morocco  Moldova  
 Netherlands, the    Mongolia  
 New Zealand   Mozambique  
 Norway   Panama 
 Oman   Paraguay 
 Portugal   Philippines  
 Rwanda   Poland 
 Saudi Arabia   Romania  
 Singapore  Russia  
 Sri Lanka   Serbia  
 Sweden   Slovakia  
 Switzerland   Slovenia  
 Syria   Ukraine  
 Trinidad   Uruguay 
 Tunisia   Zambia  
 United Kingdom, the     
 United States, the     
 Vietnam    
 
